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Abstract
After a break of 41 years, 2009 saw the first influenza pan-
demic of the 21st century caused by a triple-reassortant influ-
enza A (H1N1) virus. The current estimated case fatality rate
is lower than that of previous influenza pandemics, but this
may change as the pandemic evolves. Illness frequently
occurs in previously healthy, young adults with a wide range
of clinical presentations. The majority of circulating pandem-
ic viruses remain susceptible to neuraminidase inhibitors,
although all strains are intrinsically resistant to the adaman-
tanes. Monovalent vaccines against the pandemic strain are
available in both live attenuated and inactivated forms. This
review aims to summarise important virological, epidemio-
logical and clinical aspects of the pandemic influenza A
(H1N1) virus for physicians and other clinical personnel.
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Introduction
On 11 June 2009, only 2 months after the first human infec-
tions with a novel influenza A (H1N1) virus of swine origin
were reported from Mexico and the USA (1), the World
Health Organization (WHO) declared the first influenza pan-
demic of the 21st century (2).
Within weeks, the pandemic influenza A (H1N1) 2009
virus wfrom here on referred to as pandemic H1N1/09 virus
(3)x, a triple-reassortant swine influenza virus, had spread
across much of the globe. As of 15 November 2009, more
than 526,060 cases of pandemic H1N1/09 infection have
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been reported worldwide from over 206 countries and terri-
tories, with at least 6770 deaths (4). Since it is no longer
required to confirm or report all clinically diagnosed cases,
this figure significantly underestimates the true number of
cases.
Influenza A viruses are well recognised for their potential
to cause pandemics, which has happened three times during
the 20th century (5). The highly pathogenic avian influenza
(HPAI) A (H5N1) virus re-emerged at the end of 2003, and
has since spread over wide areas of Asia, Europe, and Africa,
causing sporadic but severe human cases (442 cases with 262
deaths as of 24 September 2009) (6). As a consequence,
pandemic preparedness has been strengthened significantly
over the past years. The 2009 pandemic is putting these
measures to the test – although the new virus is thus far not
highly virulent, the outbreak has caused considerable disrup-
tion worldwide. Clinical findings vary from asymptomatic
infection to acute illness progressing to acute respiratory dis-
tress syndrome, frequently in young patients (7–9). As the
influenza season has now come to an end in the southern
hemisphere, the upcoming influenza season in the northern
hemisphere will pose a challenge to healthcare services.
This review is based on the knowledge gained during the
first 6 months of the pandemic, and aims to summarise
important virological, epidemiological and clinical aspects of
the pandemic H1N1/09 virus. It reflects the current state of
knowledge, and as the pandemic evolves and more scientific
studies are conducted, some of the statements made might
soon be obsolete.
Virology
Influenza A viruses are negative-sense, single-stranded RNA
viruses that belong to the family Orthomyxoviridae. Their
genome is divided into eight segments, so that concurrent
infection with two different strains can lead to reassortment,
producing new viral strains. The envelope glycoproteins,
haemagglutinin (HA) and neuraminidase (NA), are the major
antigenic determinants of the cellular and humoral immune
response to infection. They are also used to subtype influenza
A viruses into 16 HA and nine NA subtypes. Aquatic birds
are the natural reservoir of all influenza A virus subtypes,
but only H1, H2 and H3, and N1 and N2 subtypes have
become established in human beings.
Phylogenetic analyses of the pandemic H1N1/2009 virus
show that six genome segments stem from a triple-reassor-
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Figure 1 Origin of the pandemic H1N1/09 virus.
It contains gene segments most closely related to those from triple-reassortant North American H1N1 swine influenza virus and Eurasian
swine influenza virus. It is unknown when the latest reassortment event took place.
tant virus circulating in North American swine, seeded from
human H3N2 (PB1), avian (PB2 and PA) and classical swine
(HA, NP and NS) lineages. The neuraminidase and matrix
gene segments are most closely related to the Eurasian avian-
like swine H1N1 lineage (Figure 1) (10, 11). The high
sequence identity (99.9%) within each gene segment
between isolates of the pandemic H1N1/09 virus suggest that
the inter-species transmission was a single event or multiple
events involving closely related viruses relatively recently
(11).
The new virus may have been circulating undetected in
swine herds for several years, as the closest ancestors for all
eight segments are of swine origin and surveillance for swine
influenza viruses is poor. However, although pandemic
H1N1/09 infection has been described in swine herds and
occasionally in other animal species in various countries, evi-
dence points towards transmission from humans to pigs, i.e.,
reverse zoonoses (12).
Pathogenesis
Several genes are involved in determining influenza virus
host- and tissue specificity, as well as pathogenicity, includ-
ing HA, PB2, PB1-F2 and NS1 (13, 14). Sequence analyses
of pandemic H1N1/09 virus isolates do not show genetic
markers associated with high pathogenicity or increased
transmissibility (11). This suggests that unknown genetic
determinants may be responsible for the efficient transmis-
sion and replication of pandemic H1N1/09 virus in humans.
Pandemic H1N1/09 virus pathogenicity and transmissibil-
ity studies conducted in ferrets, mice and cynomolgus
macaques proved that the pandemic strain is more pathogenic
than seasonal H1N1 influenza, as the virus replicated more
efficiently in the lungs of all three animal models (15–17).
Macaque lungs demonstrated severe thickening of the alve-
olar walls, and the alveolar spaces were filled with inflam-
matory infiltrates and oedematous exudates. Both type I and
type II pneumocytes were infected. Ferrets inoculated with
pandemic H1N1/09 virus displayed more severe symptoms,
involving the entire respiratory tract, compared with ferrets
inoculated with seasonal influenza A (H1N1) which dis-
played symptoms of necrotising rhinitis only (17). The detec-
tion of pandemic H1N1/09 virus in the intestinal tract of
some infected ferrets is consistent with the gastrointestinal
complaints from several human patients with pandemic
H1N1/09 infection (16).
There is conflicting evidence regarding the transmissibility
of pandemic H1N1/09 in animal models. Two of the studies
found that it spreads as efficiently as seasonal influenza A
(H1N1) via aerosols and respiratory droplets (15, 17). How-
ever, one study found that pandemic H1N1/09 virus is trans-
mitted less efficiently via respiratory droplets (16). Droplet
transmission does appear to be effective in humans, as an
outbreak of pandemic H1N1/09 among tourists in China was
caused by talking with the index patient at close range (18).
There is very limited data available regarding the systemic
pathology of pandemic H1N1/09 virus infection in humans.
Only one case series on the autopsy findings of 21 confirmed
infections in Brazilian patients has been published to date
(19). Macroscopically, the lungs were diffusely oedematous
with varying degrees of haemorrhage. Microscopically, three
distinct patterns of pulmonary changes were identified:
1) exudative diffuse alveolar damage, with alveolar fibrinous
exudates and oedema, interstitial oedema and reactive pneu-
mocytes; 2) exudative diffuse alveolar damage with severe
haemorrhage; and 3) severe necrotising bronchiolitis with
extensive bronchiolar wall necrosis and dense neutrophilic
infiltrates. None of the other organs that were examined
showed signs of direct viral injury, and any changes in these
organs were due to secondary organ failure.
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Epidemiology
Basic reproductive number (R0)
R0 is an estimate of the average number of secondary cases
generated per primary case and needs to exceed 1 to sustain
an epidemic. The R0 for pandemic H1N1/09 has been report-
ed to range from 1.37 to 2.3 (20–22). In Japan, a minor-
specific R0 was calculated to be 2.8, suggesting that a
population of minors can sustain transmission of the pan-
demic H1N1/09 strain amongst themselves (22). These
reported estimates are greater than the mean reproductive
number for seasonal influenza epidemics spanning three dec-
ades in temperate European countries, estimated at 1.3 (23).
Factors unrelated to the causative agent of an epidemic
may also influence the perceived R0. These include the use
of antiviral medications, the specific point during the epi-
demic at which the R0 is reported, public awareness with
utilisation of health services or reporting systems, as well as
the presence of large clusters. The R0 may be overestimated
if large clusters, such as schools, day care centres or old age
homes are included, and should therefore be interpreted with
caution (20).
Secondary attack rate
The secondary attack rate in households has been estimated
to range from 7.6% to 33% (24–26), and was significantly
higher among siblings than other family members (24).
Social distancing and school closures can theoretically
reduce peak influenza attack rates by 40%–50%, especially
when used in combination with prophylactic treatment (27,
28).
Pre-existing immunity and age distribution
Older individuals may have a degree of cross protection
conferred by neutralising antibodies directed against other
influenza A viruses, as suggested by serologic studies dem-
onstrating higher antibody titres in individuals born before
1950 (29). This is supported by the higher frequency of dis-
ease in younger individuals, even in the absence of obvious
large clusters (20). Despite this, the median age of cases
positive for pandemic H1N1/09 in Australia was not much
different from seasonal H1N1 infection during 2007 and
2008 (21 vs. 23 years). Seasonal influenza A (H3N2) infec-
tion, which dominated in previous years, tends to occur in
older people (median of 33 years in 2008 in the same pop-
ulation). Therefore, the dominating seasonal strain needs to
be taken into account when comparing the age distribution
of cases of seasonal and pandemic strains (30).
Approximately 7% of adults and one-third of those above
65 years of age have protective levels of pre-existing anti-
bodies, with the highest titres of antibodies found in subjects
born before 1930, who were likely exposed to the 1918-like
H1N1 virus (29, 31). It is also possible that heterotypic
immunity from antibodies against neuraminidase or cellular
immune responses may contribute to the protection in older
adults (29). The younger median age of cases of the current
pandemic may also reflect differences in social networking
between age groups, and case-ascertainment bias may also
account for differences in observed rates, as young patients
may present more readily for testing (32).
Spread
During the influenza season in the southern hemisphere,
selected countries reported laboratory based incidence rates
ranging from 25 to 75/100,000 population (33–35). Sentinel
surveillance in Australia reported that more than 90% of
influenza-like illness cases were positive for the pandemic
strain by the 8th week of surveillance, with a peak of 95%
by the 10th week (30). This was comparable to surveillance
results from New Zealand and South Africa that showed an
epidemic peak 4–8 weeks after the first reported case, and
continuing for about 4 weeks (34, 35).
Clinical characteristics
Age
Pandemic H1N1/09 has been shown to affect all age groups,
with a preponderance of younger cases. Notification rates in
New Zealand were notably higher in those under 1 year of
age and those aged 15–29 years (219/100,000 and 125/
100,000, respectively) compared with older individuals (35),
consistent with the demonstrated lack of pre-existing anti-
bodies in children and young adults (29).
The median age from various reporting countries ranges
from 13 years to 23 years (20, 30, 33, 34, 36). In South
Africa, 64% of cases were under the age of 20 years (34),
and in North America, 60% of all identified cases were under
the age of 18 years (32). Some countries reported only
5%–8% of cases to be older than 50 years (32, 36).
Reports on hospitalised patients (with confirmed or prob-
able infection) indicated a median age ranging from 31 to
44 years (36), with up to 90% of admitted patients under 52
(7, 8) and up to 18% under 5 years of age (32).
The median age of patients admitted to an intensive care
unit (ICU) was 32–43 years (36, 37). Comparing the median
age of hospitalised and non-hospitalised cases revealed that
the median age of patients requiring admission is higher than
that of non-hospitalised cases. However, infants (-1 year of
age) had the highest age specific incidence of ICU admission
in New Zealand (38).
Signs and symptoms
Presenting symptoms were most commonly fever (91%–
100%), respiratory symptoms (92%–100%), sore throat
(66%–77%) generalised weakness (56%–77%), rhinorrhoea
(76%), myalgias (40%–60%), headache (22%–57%) and
gastrointestinal symptoms, such as nausea, vomiting or diar-
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Table 1 Groups at increased risk of severe disease from pandemic
H1N1/09 virus infection (41).
1. Infants and young children, in particular -2 years
2. Pregnant women
3. Persons of any age with chronic pulmonary disease (e.g., asth-
ma, COPD)
3. Persons of any age with chronic cardiac disease (e.g., conges-
tive cardiac failure)
4. Persons with metabolic disorders (e.g., diabetes)
5. Persons with chronic renal or hepatic disease, certain neurolog-
ical conditions, haemoglobinopathies, or primary or secondary
immunosuppressive conditions
6. Children receiving chronic aspirin therapy
7. Persons )65 years
rhoea (22%–39%) (7, 8, 20, 32, 37, 39). Diarrhoea as a pre-
senting symptom seems to occur more frequently in children
than in adults (39), with up to 80% of children below the
age of 14 years affected (7). Although gastrointestinal symp-
toms are unusual as signs of influenza, the frequency in the
current pandemic is similar to previously described triple-
reassortant swine influenza virus cases (40). The median
time from onset of symptoms to hospital admission was
between 3 and 6 days, and 1 day from hospitalisation to ICU
admission (7, 8, 37, 39).
Hospitalisation
From countries in the southern hemisphere, 23.6%–30.6% of
reported cases required hospital admission, of which
11.7%–18.5% were admitted to the ICU (3.6%–4.4% of the
total number of cases) (35, 36). In contrast, northern hemi-
sphere countries reported between 9% and 20.3% of con-
firmed pandemic H1N1/09 cases to require hospitalisation,
of which 19%–36% (2%–3.9% of the total number of cases)
required ICU admission (32, 37, 39).
Children accounted for 32%–45% of all admissions (36,
39), and had a marginally shorter median duration of admis-
sion compared to adults (3 vs. 4 days) (36). Hospitalisation
rates were slightly higher in females than in males (24.3/
100,00 and 20.9/100,000, respectively) (35), which resulted
in 52%–67% of all admitted patients being female (32, 38)
potentially explained by the higher risk conferred by
pregnancy.
Hypertension (17%), diabetes mellitus (17%) and exacer-
bation of asthma or chronic obstructive pulmonary disease
(11%–14%) were commonly identified as concomitant pre-
senting conditions (7, 37, 38). In a USA cohort, 40% of
hospitalised patients had radiologic findings consistent with
pneumonia, 66% of which had an underlying medical con-
dition. Patients with pneumonia on chest radiograph were
more likely to have received antibiotics (97%) than antivirals
(73%). Less than 2% of hospitalised patients had positive
blood cultures, mainly due to Escherichia coli, Streptococcus
pneumoniae and group A streptococcus (39).
Intensive care
As stated previously, between 11.7% and 36% of hospital
admissions required intensive care, and the majority required
ventilatory assistance (36). Respiratory support in the form
of invasive ventilation was required by 56%–81% of patients
for a median of 8 days (7, 36–39). Twelve percent of ICU
admissions required extra-corporeal membrane oxygenation
(36). Between 50% and 59% of patients required vasopres-
sive support during hospitalisation, and 28%–69% received
corticosteroids (7, 8, 37). In some cohorts, all patients requir-
ing mechanical ventilation had chest radiograph findings
consistent with a diagnosis of acute respiratory distress syn-
drome (7). Seventy-one percent of critically ill patients had
bilateral infiltrates on chest radiograph (37), likely due to
primary viral pneumonia/pneumonitis. This is the most com-
mon clinical finding in severe cases and is present in up to
49% of cases (9, 38). In Australia and New Zealand, the
number of ICU admissions due to influenza A infection was
15 times higher than that for viral pneumonitis in recent
years (38).
Secondary bacterial pneumonia was found in 20.3%–
32.1% of critically ill patients, the majority being caused by
Staphylococcus aureus (up to 44%, including methicillin-
resistant strains) or Streptococcus pneumoniae and Group A
Streptococcus (12%) (8, 9, 32, 37, 38). A clinical diagnosis
of sepsis was established in 31% of critically ill patients,
while 95% of ICU patients received antibiotics (39).
Impact on health services
Despite the high ICU admission rates, ICU occupancy in
New Zealand peaked at about 25% of national capacity (35),
and 30% of New South Wales’ ICU capacity was occupied
by confirmed or suspected pandemic H1N1/09 (36). The
greatest impact on ICU resources was estimated to occur
;4–6 weeks following the first confirmed winter ICU
admission, although the increased workload lasted several
weeks (38). In Australia, emergency department presenta-
tions and ambulance calls were increased by 6.3% and 13%,
respectively, over the corresponding period for 2008 (36).
Groups at increased risk
According to the WHO, risk factors for severe illness due to
pandemic H1N1/09 seem to be similar to those for seasonal
influenza (Table 1), with particular emphasis on the follow-
ing categories: children under the age of 2 years, pregnant
women (especially in the 3rd trimester) and patients with
chronic lung conditions, such as asthma and chronic obstruc-
tive pulmonary disease (9).
At the time of presentation, comorbidities were present in
67%–100% of hospitalised patients, with a median of two
comorbidities in critically ill patients (8, 37–39). Underlying
conditions were identified in up to 60% of children, which
is higher than the reported rates for seasonal influenza
(37%–43%) (39, 42, 43). Data on the frequency of comorbid
conditions in non-hospitalised patients are not available. Pre-
existing conditions considered as comorbidities were not
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always defined, but investigators frequently used those
included in clinical outcome scores, such as Acute Physiol-
ogy and Chronic Health Evaluation II (APACHE II), Pedi-
atric Risk of Mortality (PRISM) or Sequential Organ Failure
Assessment (SOFA).
The most common comorbidities reported were chronic
lung disease (up to 41%, including asthma at 27%–29%),
obesity (22%–36.2%), hypertension (24%–26%) (34,
37–39) and human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) infection
(53%) in some populations (34). Active tuberculosis was
identified in 9.7% of fatal South African cases (34).
Pregnancy
During previous pandemics and seasonal influenza epidem-
ics, pregnant women were at higher risk for influenza-related
morbidity and mortality compared with non-pregnant wom-
en, with a 27% mortality rate in the 1918–1919 influenza
pandemic. Pregnancy also accounted for 50% of influenza-
related deaths amongst women of reproductive age in the
1957–1958 pandemic (44). Influenza infection also account-
ed for ;50% of all morbidity suffered by females in the
third trimester of pregnancy over a 20-year period in the
USA (45). Up to 33% of pregnant patients present with
comorbid conditions, most often asthma (21%), although
some studies have reported all pregnant patients to have been
previously healthy (39, 46, 47).
The estimated risk of admission for pandemic H1N1/09
virus infection early in the pandemic was four times greater
for pregnant females than for the general population (46).
Pregnant patients accounted for 7% of hospital admissions
and 7.7%–9.1% of ICU admissions, compared to the esti-
mated pregnancy rate of 1% in the general population for
some of the reporting countries (32, 37–39). Hospital admis-
sion rates may be inflated where clinicians have a lower
threshold for admitting pregnant women (46). During pre-
vious seasonal influenza epidemics, females in the third
trimester of pregnancy were three to four times more likely
to require hospital admission for an acute cardiopulmonary
condition compared with postpartum women (44). During
the current pandemic, pregnant patients were more likely to
present in the second (17%–56%) or third trimester
(26%–67%) than in the first trimester (9%–11%) (39, 46).
The increased morbidity and mortality in pregnant patients
may result from an altered immunological state, mechanical
differences, such as decreased lung capacity, or physiologic
changes, such as increased oxygen requirements (44). Preg-
nant patients may be exposed to the pandemic virus more
frequently by living with young children, but it is unlikely
that this accounts for all observed cases (47).
Comorbidities
Obesity has previously been associated with an increase in
morbidity in critically ill patients, with a significantly higher
rate of respiratory failure when compared to patients who
were not overweight, but not consistently with mortality (48).
Patients requiring admission during the current pandemic fre-
quently had a higher body mass index (BMI) than the general
population, and the mean BMI in one study was calculated
at 34.6 (37). For hospitalised patients, between 29% and 36%
were obese (BMI)30) and 14%–26% were severely obese
(BMI)40), which is higher than the estimated general prev-
alence from corresponding countries (8, 37–39). There was,
however, no significant difference in BMI demonstrated
between ICU non-survivors and survivors (37). Studies
reported up to 90% of obese patients and 67% of obese chil-
dren presented with underlying medical conditions (39),
which may be confounding factors.
Little data have been published on the contribution of HIV
towards pandemic H1N1/09-related morbidity or mortality.
Fifty-three percent of confirmed fatalities in South Africa
that were tested for HIV infection were found to be HIV-
positive (34). It is expected that HIV infected patients may
be at greater risk for rapidly progressing disease or secondary
bacterial infections, and early empiric treatment with neur-
aminidase inhibitors are emphasised (49). Generally, guide-
lines for testing, treatment and chemoprophylaxis are similar
to other groups that are at risk for complications of influenza
infection. Patients with HIV are one of the target groups for
the pandemic H1N1/09 vaccine and seasonal vaccine, and
should receive the injectable inactivated form of either vac-
cine (49).
Health care workers
Health care workers appear to be at risk of contracting pan-
demic H1N1/09 infection if proper infection control meas-
ures are not adhered to. An early case report from Mexico
reported that 12% of health care workers caring for influenza
cases developed respiratory symptoms, although not all
were confirmed to be pandemic H1N1/09 (7). After infection
control measures were implemented, documented trans-
mission decreased dramatically to between 0% and 0.6%
(7, 8).
Mortality
Mortality rate
During the early stages of the pandemic, the overall mortality
rate from pandemic H1N1/09 infection was 7% in hospita-
lised patients (39), 41% in critically ill patients and up to
58% in ventilated patients (7, 8). Mortality rates reported
early in a pandemic may be higher due to delayed initiation
of antiviral therapy or delayed admission to the hospital.
In more recent case series, ICU mortality ranged from
16.9% to 28% (38, 39), the majority of fatalities occurring
within the first 28 days of intensive care (37). Median dura-
tion of ICU stay was shorter for non-survivors at 7–10 days
compared with survivors (12–13.5 days) (8, 36, 37). Inter-
estingly, a higher percentage of patients admitted to ICU for
seasonal flu in New Zealand and Australia demised com-
pared with those admitted for pandemic H1N1/09, although
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the pandemic strain had a higher absolute number of fatali-
ties (38).
Early in the pandemic, the case fatality rate (CFR) was
estimated at 0.33%, higher than for seasonal influenza (20).
A study from New Zealand reported an estimated CFR of
0.005% based on general practice surveillance of influenza-
like illness and reported fatalities in hospitalised patients
(35). This is markedly lower than the estimated CFR of 2.0%
for the 1918 pandemic in New Zealand (35), although it may
increase during a possible second wave of the pandemic.
Age
The median age of fatal cases in the southern hemisphere,
ranging from 39 to 58 years (33, 36), was higher than that
reported from the northern hemisphere (26 years) (39). The
mortality in children appears to be less than in older patients,
as 8% of children in a Canadian case series died compared
to 17.3% of the entire study population (37). The mean age
of survivors was 15–30 years compared with the mean age
of non-survivors which ranged from 34 to 42 years (34, 37)
which was significant in the South African cohort (p-0.01)
(34).
Risk factors
In Australia and New Zealand, three factors were indepen-
dently associated with in-hospital death: invasive ventilation,
any co-existing medical condition as defined by the
APACHE II–scoring system, and older age at an odds ratio
of 1.02 per year of age (38).
Between 68% and 88.5% of fatal cases had an underlying
chronic medical condition (36, 39), with chronic lung disease
(33%), including asthma (17%), and chronic cardiovascular
disease (23%) being the most common (36).
Fatalities during pregnancy followed a gestational distri-
bution comparable to hospital admissions: 67%–85% of
patients in the third trimester, 5%–17% in the second tri-
mester and 10% in the puerperium (34, 46). In keeping with
hospitalisation rates, pregnancy has been shown to confer a
7.7 times higher risk for death over that for the general pop-
ulation (47). In a South African study, 28.4% of all fatalities
were pregnant, which accounted for 56% of all females of
reproductive age (34). All recorded fatalities in pregnant
females resulted from primary viral pneumonia with subse-
quent acute respiratory distress syndrome (46, 47). Of those
who died in South Africa, 71.4% were HIV positive and 19%
had concurrent active tuberculosis (34).
Patients who died were likely to have more severe illness
and greater organ dysfunction at presentation, as assessed by
the APACHE II or SOFA scores, compared with those who
survived (7, 8, 37). In some series, all patients who died had
documented multiple organ failure with significantly higher
rates of renal failure (83% vs. 7%) compared with survivors
(7). Patients who died during hospitalisation were more like-
ly to have refractory hypotension (100%) than those who
survived (14%) (7).
Laboratory diagnosis
Various diagnostic methods are available to confirm influ-
enza A virus infection in respiratory samples. Rapid antigen
tests and direct immunofluorescence assays (DFA) do not
distinguish between different influenza A virus subtypes, and
therefore cannot confirm an isolate to be pandemic H1N1/
09. Selected reverse-transcriptase polymerase chain reaction
(RT-PCR) systems as well as viral culture together with com-
plementary tests have the ability to subtype influenza A virus
strains (50).
Rapid antigen tests generally have low sensitivity
(11%–69%) for detecting pandemic H1N1/09 (50–54). The
sensitivity of all rapid tests decreased markedly with decreas-
ing virus titres in specimens (51). However, the reported
specificity was consistently greater than 93% (50, 52). DFA
showed comparable specificity to rapid antigen tests (99.6%
vs. 99.5%), but higher sensitivity (47.2% vs. 21.2%) (50).
The positive predictive value of rapid antigen tests or DFA
is generally high when specific influenza viruses are circu-
lating in the community. Under these circumstances, a pos-
itive result indicates probable infection with the circulating
strain, but a negative result does not rule out infection and
requires further testing (55). Viral culture showed a sensitiv-
ity of 88.9% and a specificity of 100% in the diagnosis of
pandemic H1N1/09 when compared with a combination of
RT-PCR, DFA and rapid antigen tests (50).
RT-PCR is superior to other methods for the diagnosis of
pandemic H1N1/09 infection, with high sensitivity (97.8%)
and specificity (100%) when compared to a combination of
rapid antigen tests, DFA and viral culture (50). The ability
to subtype influenza A strains rapidly can save time and
resources, and may be especially important when pandemic
H1N1/09 and seasonal influenza strains co-circulate, posing
a risk of intra-human reassortment (56).
Laboratory confirmation of suspected cases of pandemic
H1N1/09 virus infection is particularly important at the
beginning of outbreaks. Once pandemic H1N1/09 is known
to be the predominant circulating strain in a community,
patients with typical influenza-like illness can be diagnosed
on the basis of clinical presentation alone, which has a high
predictive value (Figure 2). Laboratory testing should be
reserved for high-risk patients, unusual cases or those with
severe or progressive illness, especially where it may influ-
ence clinical management, but initiation of antiviral therapy
should never be delayed (55). As seen during the Severe
Acure Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) outbreak in 2003 (57),
laboratory testing plays a modest role in patient management
during outbreaks.
Antiviral treatment
Pandemic H1N1/09 virus is thus far susceptible to neur-
aminidase inhibitors. Treatment with oseltamivir or zanamivir
is recommended for all patients with confirmed or suspected
pandemic H1N1/09 requiring hospitalisation, or for those at
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Figure 2 Influenza viruses isolated from samples sent by general practitioners participating in the influenza surveillance programme in
the Western Cape Province, South Africa, from January until the end of October 2009.
During the first part of the southern hemisphere winter season, the majority of isolates were influenza A (H3N2), which was replaced by
pandemic H1N1/09 virus as the dominant strain by week 31. The national testing strategy was changed in week 32, after the first 100 cases
had been identified and sustained community transmission established.
higher risk of influenza related complications. The latter
group includes children under the age of 2 years or adults
older than 65 years, pregnant patients and those up to
2 weeks postpartum, people with chronic or immunosup-
pressive conditions and people younger than 19 years receiv-
ing long-term aspirin therapy (see also Table 1) (58).
Antiviral chemoprophylaxis for seasonal influenza with osel-
tamivir or zanamivir has been shown to be effective among
household contacts (59, 60), and is reserved for any of these
high-risk groups or health care workers following contact
with a confirmed or suspected case of pandemic H1N1/09,
although early antiviral treatment is an emphasised alterna-
tive to prophylaxis (58). Oseltamivir may also be combined
with amantadine or rimantadine if infection with either the
seasonal or pandemic H1N1/09 strain is suspected (58). In
severe cases, empiric antimicrobial therapy should be con-
sidered due to the high rate of secondary bacterial infection
(9).
Neuraminidase inhibitors are effective when started within
48 h after onset of symptoms (58). In a multivariate analysis
of hospitalised patients in the USA, receipt of antiviral drugs
in the first 2 days of illness was the only variable signifi-
cantly associated with a positive outcome (39). This is often
difficult to achieve, as illustrated by a USA study which
showed that therapy was initiated at a median of 3 days after
onset of symptoms, with only 39% of hospitalised patients
receiving antiviral therapy within 48 h (39). However, it has
been suggested that oseltamivir therapy may still be benefi-
cial in the treatment of seasonal influenza if initiated later
(61), and may therefore be of benefit in pandemic H1N1/09
infection as well. During the current pandemic, patients who
survived hospitalisation were 7.4 times (95% CI, 1.8–31)
more likely to have received neuraminidase inhibitors than
those who died (8).
Oseltamivir, normally for use in persons 1 year and older,
has been authorised by the USA Food and Drug Adminis-
tration (FDA) for emergency use to treat pandemic H1N1/
09 in infants below the age of 1 year, and for
chemoprophylaxis in those older than 3 months (58). High
dose oseltamivir (150 mg twice daily) and prolonged pro-
phylaxis at normal treatment doses have been shown to be
safe and well tolerated (62), and high dose treatment admin-
istered via nasogastric tube was shown to have a good phar-
mocokinetic profile in severe influenza A (H5N1) infection
(63). No published data have shown high dose treatment to
be more effective than treatment with normal doses (58).
Oseltamivir is preferred over zanamivir for the treatment of
pregnant women due to its systemic absorption (62, 64).
Treatment with intravenous peramivir, an unlicensed neur-
aminidase inhibitor, has been authorised by the FDA for
emergency situations (58). Early treatment with a single dose
of peramivir was found to be comparable to oral oseltamivir
(65). Peramivir is indicated for use in adults and children
that do not respond to oral or inhaled antiviral therapy, or
when drug delivery by any other route than IV is not expect-
ed to be dependable (58). Emergency use approval has been
granted for children of all ages, despite the fact that no pae-
diatric patients received peramivir in clinical trials (65, 66).
Antiviral drug resistance
All pandemic H1N1/09 strains are intrinsically resistant to
the M2 inhibitors amantadine and rimantadine due to the
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S31N mutation (serine to asparagine) in the M2 gene (32,
11). The earlier pandemic H1N1/09 isolates all tested sen-
sitive to the neuraminidase inhibitors currently available
(67). The first cases of oseltamivir-resistant pandemic H1N1/
09 virus were identified in July 2009 (68). Oseltamivir resis-
tance is conferred by the H275Y mutation (histidine to
tyrosine, H274Y in N2 numbering) in the NA gene (69).
At the time of submission, less than 40 cases of oselta-
mivir resistant pandemic H1N1/09 strains have been report-
ed. All isolates were shown to carry the H275Y mutation,
but remained sensitive to zanamivir. There is currently no
evidence of sustained transmission or that these strains arose
due to reassortment with other influenza viruses. Most of
these strains were isolated from patients who either were on
oseltamivir prophylaxis or received extended treatment
courses of the drug, although three cases of oseltamivir resis-
tance were reported in patients without a history of exposure
(70).
Chemoprophylaxis associated resistance occurred predom-
inantly as isolated events, and may be due to two possible
mechanisms, First, viral mutation during low-level replica-
tion, possibly at subtherapeutic drug levels, or second, the
resistant virus was acquired from an oseltamivir treated con-
tact, although this has not been demonstrated (70).
Sixteen cases of treatment associated resistance have been
reported to the WHO to date; seven of which occurred in
immunosuppressed patients (70). Prolonged viral shedding
increases the risk of developing drug resistance (70), and has
been demonstrated in two immunocompromised individuals
in the USA (71). Oseltamivir resistance should be considered
in patients with protracted illness, particularly in the immu-
nocompromised, and those who persistently test positive
despite extended antiviral therapy. Patients who develop
influenza-like illness despite receiving oseltamivir prophy-
laxis after exposure are also at a higher risk of developing
resistance (70).
Vaccines
There is no evidence that seasonal influenza vaccines,
including adjuvant vaccines, produce significant levels of
protection against the pandemic H1N1/09 strain (19, 29, 31).
Inactivated- and live attenuated monovalent vaccines con-
taining the A/California/7/2009 (H1N1) strain have been
approved by the FDA, European Medicines Agency (EMEA)
and other national and international regulatory bodies
(72–74). Preliminary data indicate that the safety and immu-
nogenicity profiles of the approved vaccines are similar to
those of seasonal vaccines (75, 76).
The approved age groups for the vaccines differ by man-
ufacturer and should be confirmed before administration of
any vaccine. Generally, children under nine should receive
two vaccine doses, ;4 weeks apart, as only 25% of children
under the age of 36 months and 36% of those above
36 months showed a sufficient antibody response to a single
dose of vaccine (72). As for seasonal influenza vaccine, pan-
demic H1N1/09 vaccine is recommended for pregnant
females at all stages of pregnancy (77). The vaccine should
also reduce morbidity in the offspring, as seasonal influenza
vaccine delivered to mothers has been shown to reduce influ-
enza related morbidity by 63% in infants up to the age of
6 months (78).
Outlook
In contrast to many other zoonotic viruses that emerge unex-
pectedly (79), influenza pandemics can and must be expect-
ed. Despite years of pandemic preparation, most countries
were poorly prepared for the current challenge. It is fortu-
nately not a highly dangerous pathogen. However, even low
mortality rates can result in large numbers of fatalities when
few individuals have pre-existing immunity. This may also
still change, as the new virus could adapt further to human
hosts.
Antiviral treatment is widely available, although over use
has occurred and some patients did not have access due to
poor policies and implementation. Specific vaccines were
developed rapidly, but immunisation programmes are chal-
lenged by major logistical and acceptance issues.
The future of pandemic H1N1/09 is uncertain. It may
cause a second pandemic wave, as observed in previous pan-
demics, or it may replace or reassort with human seasonal A
(H1N1) or A (H3N2) virus, or even with HPAI H5N1. It is,
therefore, essential that comprehensive surveillance in human
beings and animals is maintained to monitor the pandemic
potential of influenza viruses.
Highlights
• Illness frequently occurs in previously healthy, young
adults with a wide range of clinical presentations.
• The CFR of pandemic H1N1/09 is lower than that of
previous influenza pandemics.
• Pregnant patients in the second or third trimesters, or ear-
ly in the puerperium are at increased risk of developing
severe disease.
• Primary viral pneumonia is the most common clinical
finding in severe cases.
• Rapid antigen tests cannot confirm or exclude the diag-
nosis of pandemic H1N1/09 infection, and clinical diag-
nosis should be confirmed by RT-PCR in selected cases.
• The majority of circulating strains remain susceptible to
the neuraminidase inhibitors.
• Live attenuated- and inactivated monovalent vaccines are
available for indicated risk- and age groups.
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